5. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitu tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con ventions in three fourths thereof ...• U.S. CONST REv. 1221 REv. , 1246 REv. (1995 (referring to recent work of Ackerman and Amar and stating that "I am tempted to note the emergence of a distinctive new 'Yale school' of constitutional interpretation"). 9. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed, 1988)); see also NEIL Ackerman and Amar have inherited the earlier school's keen sense of institutional competence. They are, however, more openly normative than the mid-century legal process adherents.1 0 Their ef forts -in truth, too inchoate to label a school -are similarly dis tinguishable from second-generation democratic process theory (best represented in the work of John Hart Ely11) because they hold that some substantive values are immune from ordinary democratic process and can only be changed by a complex constitutional pro cess. Nonetheless, they concentrate on the means of change rather than the political values that actually change. The examples they give of the latter they find coherent and unproblematic: the Founding institutionalized popular sovereignty, the notion that the people could govern themselves; Reconstruction enshrined racial equality; and (for Ackerman) the New Deal legitimated the welfare state.
Ackerman and Amar have written large, dense books. No re view can do justice to the intricate arguments of either, let alone both. This review aims only to sketch the historical accounts in each book, explore the premise of popular sovereignty in both, and suggest what this tum to history indicates about American constitutionalism.
I. MAPPING CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS
Ackerman and Amar know the historiography of the federal Constitution well. They delve into the primary sources of certain transformative periods and offer many fresh insights about Ameri can law and history. Their research substantially overlaps. Both discuss the Founding of the Constitution in the 1780s (Ackerman pp. 32-9 5; Amar pp. 3-13 3) and Reconstruction following the Civil War (Ackerman pp. 99-2 52; Amar pp. 166-294). To these, Ackerman adds a third transformation: the New Deal (pp. 255-382). This is not the only difference between them. Ackerman's perspective is broader, encompassing the whole expanse of United States constitutional development. In contrast, Amar confines him self to the (still capacious) story of the Bill of Rights, its origins and revision in the 1860s. Moreover, Amar is more of a textualist, dog gedly pointing out the repetition of key words, here in the main body of the Constitution, there in the amendments, once again in White , Th e Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Cr iticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279 {1973).
10. For Ackerman's critique of the legal process school, see RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 38-42.
11. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW {1980).
Th e Fe dera list Pap ers, and so on.12 As historians, both are more hedgehog than fox;13 the big truth they know is popular sover eignty.14 But Amar is more impressive when playing the fox. Tight and full of close readings, his book might affect constitutional law on the ground, perhaps footnoted beneath knotty analyses in the Un ited Sta tes Reports. Ackerman is after bigger game: the consti tutional consciousness of the legal community.
A. Ackerman's High Road to Constitutional History "Th[e] focus upon successful moments of mobilized popular re newal," writes Ackerman early in Tra nsformations, "distinguishes the American Constitution from most others in the modern world" (p. 5) . His fundamental claim, argued now for fifteen years,15 is that the United States is a "dualistic democracy," meaning that its constitutional history follows two tracks: "normal politics" and "constitutional politics." On the first track runs most of American political history. Ordinarily, government is administered by the People's representatives, voted in and tossed out of office by a skeptical public, who devote more time to private than public con cerns. This is as it should be, thinks Ackerman, for there is more to life than government. But then there are extraordinary moments when the People think seriously about their Constitution. At these times of constitutional politics, they may set aside the textual for-. malities of amendment and redefine the parameters of normal poli tics or "normal lawmaking."16
In his trilogy, Ackerman approaches the three moments -Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal-from three angles. In the first volume, Fo undations, Ackerman established his dualist framework, sketched his three-moment scheme of constitutional history, and declared his desire to reconstruct for "the caste of American lawyers and judges . . . something I will call a profes sional narrative, a story describing how the American people got from the Founding in 1787 to the Bicentennial of yesterday."17 In Tra nsformations, he fleshes out the historical moments and traces 12. See, e.g., Amar at 27 (connecting use of "the People" in the Constitution, First Amendment, and in the ratification debates). Amar labels as "intratextuality" such "textual cross-references to the original Constitution and Bill " and relationships between the Bill and other key English and American documents. P. 296. 13. For this distinction, see lsAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN EssAY ON TOLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY (1953) .
14. See, e.g., Ackerman at 5, 13-14, 88, 92; Amar at xiii (arguing that "[t]he essence of the Bill of Rights was more structural than not, more majoritarian than counter"). 15 . He outlined the project in Bruce A. Ackerman, Th e Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) . 16 . Ackerman su=arizes his "dualist" theory in TRANSFORMATIONS, pp. 5-6, but for a fuller treatment, see generally FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2.
17. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
[Vol. 97:1520 the different procedures used during each one to effect constitu tional change. In the forthcoming third, In terpretations, he promises to examine how the Supreme Court has made sense of, or "synthesized," the People's serial transformations.
As has been pointed out,18 Ackerman's division of constitu tional history into static periods punctuated by discontinuous change reflects the influence of paradigm theory.19 The dualism of normal and constitutional politics also artfully synthesizes the lib eral and republican interpretations of American history, drawing on both while avoiding the sterile debate of when (or if) republicanism gave way to liberalism.20 Ackerman's "liberal republicanism"21 has it both ways. The default mode of American constitutionalism is liberal, meaning that individuals are usually content to leave gov ernment to the governors and tend to their private interests. At crisis moments, however, visionary leaders initiate a dialogue about constitutional change and the People become republican citizens.
As has also been pointed out,22 Ackerman's logic suggests Hegel's. His People move through thesis and antithesis toward a new synthesis of freedom, then the process begins anew. The dia lectic is everywhere in Ackerman's books, and the personification of political phenomena comes to him reflexively. There are "Madison & Co." (the Founding) (p. 33), "Bingham & Co." (Reconstruction), and "Roosevelt & Co." (the New Deal) (p. 260), in addition to "the People. "23 There is also an undercurrent of fa talism in this otherwise exuberant tale: time and again whatever happened is seen to have happened necessarily. But these are loose methodological connections, for Ackerman avoids reliance on any 18. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1522-23 (1988 1539, 1541 (1988) . Similarly, though at a higher level of historical generality, Ackerman claimed in his first volume that the Constitution was a "creative synthesis " of the Greek tradition of "political involvement " and the "Christian suspicion of claims of secular community ... and (belief] that the secular state's coercive authority represents the supreme threat to the highest human values. " FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 321-22.
22. See Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollecti ve Im agination and the Po tential fo r Transformative Legal In terpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135 REv. , 1217 REv. (1988 .
23. In Transformations, Ackerman answers earlier charges of anthropomorphism by stat ing that "'the People' is not the name of a superhuman being, but the name of an extended process of interaction between political elites and ordinary citizens. " P. 187. Cf. p. 162 ("I will argue that it was the People themselves who took this decision away from competing political elites in Washington and decided it on their own responsibility. It is this decision of a mobilized People, and not any textual formalism, that lies at the foundation of the Four teenth Amendment. " ).
substantive body of political philosophy. So Hegel goes unnamed in these books, as does, save one negative reference, Rousseau.24 A more doctrinaire exponent of the People's political will might have given them prominent roles (whether protagonists or antagonists). Instead, even the supporting European cast of Edmund Burke and Hannah Arendt in Fo undations25 has moved offstage. The spotlight in Tra nsformations is trained on American political leaders, who initiate change, and the People, who respond.
Along with the distinction between normal and constitutional politics goes another: that between government and the People.26 This is a variation on the dichotomy, much older than paradigm theory, the republican revival, and Hegelian logic, between a spe cific governing administration and a constitution. Historically, it was not always accepted; indeed, in the early modem English world it had an oppositional quality about it. In the seventeenth century, Edward Coke, John Davies, Matthew Hale, and other common law jurists invoked an "ancient constitution" to challenge royal power.27 Similar was the contrast between a government of laws and one of men, articulated pithily during the Interregnum by English coni monwealthman James Harrington28 and circulated throughout the Atlantic world by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century, becoming commonplace in America.29 But perhaps the clearest distinction between "the constitution" and "government" came in the early eighteenth century from a former Jacobite and disgruntled Tory, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke.30 In his view, governments 24. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5. As for Hegel, Ackerman laments the turn among early twentieth-century historians to Marx and social explanations of American his tory, then celebrates the reclamation of the political by Hannah Arendt and the republican school of historians, see id. at 200-209 (Chapter Eight, "The Lost Revolution"), which might be interpreted allegorically as a recovery of the idealist thrust (though hardly the specific political program) of Hegel's philosophy. See came and went, some good and some bad, depending on whether their ministers adhered to the transcendent English constitution. This Bolingbroke defined as that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived from cer tain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed objects of pub lic good, that compose the general system, according to which the community hath agreed to be governed .... In a word .. . constitution is the rule by which our princes ought to govern at all times; govern ment is that by which they actually do govern at any particular time.31
The distinction provided leverage to criticize the Whig administra tion of Robert Walpole while maintaining a posture of political loy alty. Ackerman's point is that the two are not exclusive. His "higher lawmaking" (p. 6) comes not from the fixed principles of reason or other fundamental law tradition; nor is it ancient law. Grounded on custom and consent, it is majoritarian, but of a spe cial, dualist kind.32 That is, the Constitution is not merely the ag gregate preferences of "the winners of the last general election," what Ackerman in Fo undations calls "monist democracy. "33 In stead, it is based on a procedurally complex and restrained majori tarianism -process constitutionalism.
Ackerman's new book is long ( 42 0 pages, plus almost a thou sand endnotes) and took many years to write. He remarks with disarming candor in his preface that Foundations made many controversial historical claims, and I was obliged to substantiate them if I hoped to be taken seriously. I re turned to my historical manuscripts with trepidation. Rereading them, I was impressed with the m1mber of relevant investigations that I had not even attempted. Was I cut out for this job? [p. ix] Once he leaves the roman numbered pages and enters the arabic, Ackerman regains confidence, as he should, for Tra nsformations goes far toward making good on his earlier promises. He is an ef fective writer, though (deliberately, it seems) not an elegant one. The reader must work through five-part moments, incessant italics, and weighty capitalized nouns. Then come arrow diagrams, cross self-references, and exhortations to go "deeper." Finally, however, it all begins to flow and it matters not where you dive in, for the whole thing circles around, making the same points at new levels of generality. One volume blends into the other, themes of even ear-CAL PERSPECTIVES: STUDIES IN ENGLISH THOUGHT AND SOCIETY 93, 126 {Neil McKendrick ed., 1974) ("Bolingbroke simply wanted to remind his Whig enemies •.. of the views held by the accredited theorists of their own party about the concept of political liberty, in order to be able to make use of the immensely strong resonances of this tradition of thought to fur ther his own wholly cynical and self-interested political ends."). lier works resurface, and chits are signed for Volume 3. His goal is to demonstrate that the American People, when amending the Con stitution, have not always followed the "hypertextualist"34 require ments of Article V; yet they have followed a formula that is similar, and paradoxically more demanding, than Article V. "For Americans, law-breaking does not necessarily imply lawlessness. It is sometimes seen as a civic gesture indicating high seriousness."35
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Their change has been "unconventional" (p. 82 ) but procedurally regular. They may transform political aspiration into higher law by a variety of institutional means� so long as they engage in a constitu tional dialogue. Vocabulary and accent change; the dialogic gram mar does not.
This structuralist formula for constitutional change has five stages: signal, proposal, trigger, ratification, and consolidation (pp. 39-40). Because this formula was fundamental to the Founding of the Constitution, it is intrinsic to it, not an interpretive outgrowth.36 The process has recurred successfully twice, during Reconstruction and the New Deal. Ackerman tries to defuse the criticism that the claim of recurrence is "a tell-tale sign of a grim determination to impose my fivefold schema on constitutional history without serious attention to the particularities of particular cases" by asserting that "[t]he five-phase pattern recurs because the problems recur" (p. 67). Rather than a single instance, a moment is a contractual pro cess, a series of repeated offers and acceptances between political elites and the People. By articulating the proposed change to the People, involving several governmental institutions, and heeding the returns of transformative elections, the Framers of the three constitutional transformations exercised statesmanlike vision and prudence. And each time the People tendered well-considered acceptances.
Rather than supposing that the People speak directly at the ballot box, the Federalist precedent promises legitimation through a deepen-34. Ackerman labels "hypertextualist" those who treat Article V as the exclusive means of amendment. He does not call this position merely "textualist" because he argues that the Founders meant to allow other modes of change too; they believed, as an originalist matter, in "pluralist" methods of amendment. ing institutional dialogue between political elites and ordinary citizens.
The idea is that a form of complex, and temporally extended, institu tional practice will ultimately permit a group of revolutionary reform ers a kind of popular authority that is qualitatively different from normal electoral victories. [pp. [84] [85] In this qualified sense, Ackerman makes an originalist argu ment:37 the writ of constitutional ejectment is not his; it is the Founders'. To document his case, Ackerman begins not quite at the beginnin g but rather the conventional beginnin g: the writing of the federal Constitution.38 He argues that the Philadelphia Convention engaged in illegal constitution-making. Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation required unanimous approval by the state legisla tures for any amendment. But the Convention took "the law into its own hands" and became "a secessionist body" (p. 35), creating the troublesome irony that the world's most famous constitution rests on a co up d'etat. Well, Ackerman argues, not quite. The Federalists put aside Article 13 , but not constitutional process. At each step toward organizing the new Constitution they won "offi cial confirmations" for facially "illegal initiative[s]," thereby repeat edly gaining "enough acceptance by enough standing institutions to sustain their momentum" (p. 39).
Here follows an ingenious mapping of the "fivefold schema" onto the writing and ratification of the Constitution. Instead of "aiming for a single grand victory," "Madison & Co." followed "a stepwise process -in which one partial initiative built on the next in a series of sequential ratifications" (p. 42). They moved from small conferences with limited agendas (Mount Vernon, Annapolis) to larger ones, exceeding their mandate at each one, yet confirmed along the way by some of the states or the Continental Congress. Thus they signaled a desire to engage in higher track constitutional creation and established a precedent for the illegality of the Philadelphia Convention. There, Federalists proposed a new re gime, and triggered "an entirely new procedure for ratification": ratification by state conventions rather than state legislatures. Fi nally, the Federalists consolidated their victory by obtaining legiti mate support in the states slow to ratify: eventually, even North Carolina and Rhode Island joined the "institutional bandwagon" (pp. 41-65). All this is not to prove Ackerman can draw an impres sive historical map. Rather, his ulterior motive is to demonstrate that the Federalists earned "a deep sense of constitutional authority even though they had not played by the rules" (pp. 39). They be-37. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Th e Ghost of Liberalism Pa st, 105 HARV. L. REv. 918, 933 (1992) (reviewing FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2) (accusing Ackerman of proposing a "liberal originalism").
38. There are a few perfunctory references to the English Convention of 1688 as a loose precedent for 1787. Pp. 33, 81-82, 162, 169.
haved illegally but legitimately, adhering to a constitutional order if not textual law. 39 It is an impressive performance. There is something persuasive and hopeful about dualism.40 It is wrong to consider the Founding a conspiracy and morally attractive to emphasize the participatory elements of American constitutional history. More were involved than Federalists, government bondholders, or other elite groups. And Ackerman correctly points out that the Constitution quickly attained legitimacy. Tr ue, he leaves out the important role the Bill of Rights played in this story, but Ackerman's scheme is flexible enough to incorporate this fact (it might fit nicely beneath consoli dation) and others necessarily omitted in a sixty-page rendition of the Founding.
The flexibility of Ackerman's scheme resides in its abstraction. This is not an unqualified good. The Annapolis Conference was a "signal" for constitutional revision? For purposes of an historical survey, it may be useful to see it as such, now. But does it rob the actual moment, then, of its uncertainty? While Ackerman wants to restore the agency of the People, he glosses over the concrete choices made by key figures in the late 1780s, a variegated group not well captured by "Madison & Co." Figuring who wanted what, and realizing that not all the Founders (or the voting public, let alone the larger majority of the People without the vote )41 wanted the same thing, is not to backslide into Beardianism.42 In retro spect, historical development often looks linear, graduated, and ra tional. Depending on the facts marshalled, and how they are arranged, almost any transition might be anatomized in terms of signal, proposal, trigger, ratification, and consolidation. Like many models, it is diffi cult to disprove because it is (abstractly) descrip tive and (politically) prescriptive, but not explanatory. Historians will criticize the theory and its proof not for being wrong but rather for not engaging several interesting levels of analysis. 39 . In Fo undations, Ackerman stressed that he found the Federalists' constitutional means, not their specific ends, attractive, and distinguished between "the revolutionary pro cess through which the Federalists mobilized popular support for their constitutional reforms, and the property-oriented substance of their particular social vision." FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 228. Most of these would involve greater specificity and Ackerman might dismiss problematic facts as irrelevant where not assimilable, so many trees and no forest. Others involve a higher level of con ceptualization and a broader temporal frame.43 Ta ke empire. The history of the British Empire in America is off Ackerman's concep tual radar. But the Empire comprised an important network of in stitutions, constitutional languages, and practices -exactly the sorts of things that interest him. And it mattered. It is not possible to understand constitutional reform in 1787 without having some grasp on how Britons in America had layered their institutions and the ways they tried to reform the Empire not once but several times in the century before the American Revolution, itself a rebellion against imperial reconstruction.44 After the Revolution, political debate continued in the key of empire: Should the Union45 become a continental empire? A transatlantic commercial empire? An "[e]mpire of liberty"?46 Some combination? Alexander Hamilton referred to such questions in Fe deralist 1 when he exclaimed that the debate over the Constitution "speaks its own importance; com prehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is com posed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world."47 In short, making 1787 a discontinuous momentno past, all future -obscures the Founders' conceptual architec ture. Little wonder the People, liberal republicanism, Arendt, and Burke flood into the vacuum.
Many concede that the 1787 Constitution was born in some sort of illegality.48 But Ackerman argues that the Federalist act of crea tion was no one-off. Like the common lawyers they for the most part were, the Framers of the 1860s and 1930s followed the Federal ist precedent closely. Modes of change changed; the Federalist five part formula endured -despite Article V.49 43. On temporal frames in argumentation, see REcoNSTRUCDNG, supra note 7, at 53-55. 44 49. Ackerman's argument that the 1787 Framers did not intend Article V to be exclusive (pp. 71-81) is less compelling than his argument that, in fact, some future amendments did not adhere to Article V's rigid procedures. He follows the historical argument with a moral But were not the Reconstruction amendments (numbers 13, 14, and 15) passed pursuant to Article V? Not exactly. Ackerman re lates how these amendments were, more or less, forced upon the South. The Congress that passed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was "a Republican Rump" (p. 106) and would not have mustered the two-thirds majorities necessary if the former Confederate states had been part of it. Paradoxically, the southern states that ratified the Thirteenth Amendment were considered legal for purposes of ratification but not for Congressional repre sentation. Most of the Confederate states first rejected the Four teenth Amendment, ratifying it only after a Radical Congress granted freedmen the vote while denying it to many Confederate veterans, and after Congress stipulated ratification as a condition for its reception of southern representatives. "It follows that the process by which Congress procured ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment simply cannot be squared with the text" (p. 111). Q.E.D.: The Reconstruction amendments are actually "amendment-simulacra" (p. 270). They might be justified as war measures, but this strikes Ackerman as constitutionally unattractive and historically inaccurate.
Rejecting the "dichotomy between legalistic perfection and law less force" (p. 116), he finds instead the fivefold formula. But the formula did not operate in exactly the same way as it had at the Founding or for each Amendment. Here follows a gripping narra tive of Reconstruction constitutional politics, the strongest part of Ackerman's book. The People approved the Thirteenth Amendment under Presidential leadership, while a convention-like Republican Congress organized acceptance of the Fourteenth.
First, Thirteen. Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 signaled that a "new movement had gained sufficient political authority to demand that others take its constitutional intentions seriously" (p. 127). The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 initiated the propo sa l for constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.50 The presi dential creation of interim southern governments served the triggering function. Then Ackerman retails the fascinating details one: later transformations were in fact more democratic than that of 1787; thus it "seems morally bizarre, as well as legally inappropriate, to grant the Federalists the constitutional authority to lay down the rules for subsequent efforts to speak in the name of the People" (p. 88). It is a subtle argument, not without problems: the Federalists had no moral or legal right to constrain the People to Article V amendments; but future transformations must ad here to their fivefold formula of non-Article V amendment 50. Ackerman here elides the story of how Lincoln's limited, and practically ineffective, proclamation (freeing only those slaves inside rebel lines -thus not under Union control) became transformed by an increasingly Radical Republican Congress into the nationally abo litionist Thirteenth Amendment. See ERic FoNER, REcoNSTRUCTioN: AMERICA'S UNFIN ISHED REvoLUTION, 1863-1877, at 60-68 (1988). Instead, he interprets the amendment proposal as akin to the "institutional bandwagon ... generated at the Founding." P. 134.
[Vol. 97:1520 behind southern ratification, rightly calling attention, for example, to "the mix of legal and translegal elements displayed in South Car olina," concluding it was "a classic case of unconventional adapta tion" (p. 14 8) . Finally came consolida tion in the form of presidential and secretary of state proclamations (pp. 150-57 ) . Once again, Ackerman succeeds in demonstrating that fundamental constitutional change occurred at a crisis moment in American his tory and not by strict adherence to written procedures.
There were for Ackerman two procedural innovations distin guishing the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. First was pres idential leadership, allowing him to "claim that a national election amounted to a constitutional mandate from the People" and to "lead[ ] other deliberative institutions to give their assent to ... his claim that th e People have spoken" (p. 157 ) . Here, Ackerman re minds us that there were, effectively, two Reconstructions: Presi dential and Congressional. (Among other virtues, this model sets the stage for the New Deal. ) Second, the process was "more nation-centered" than that of 1787 (p. 157 ). Reconstruction dealt the states a blow, not least to their role in making unconventional amendments.s 1
The story of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of congressional leadership. Congress's exclusion of the white South from its halls, and Johnson's vetoes of Radical legislation, signaled another phase of higher lawmaking. Then the Radical Republicans proposed the Amendment. The Radical landslide victory in the 1866 midterm election triggered fundamental change, bringing to Washington a "convention-like" Congress, meaning that "its perceived legitimacy reside[ d] primarily in its appeal to the ideal of popular sovereignty, rather than its established legality" (p. 16 8) . Ackerman reads the proposal as placing political identity above racial identity in Ameri can culture (p.181 ) , thus taking his stand with those who argue that the Radicals were dedicated to the ideal of racial equality and not just out to punish the "Slave Power."52 He also places the First and Second Reconstruction Acts alongside the Fourteenth Amendment as "triggering decisions -leaving it up to the (nationally defined ) People of each state to determine whether they would go along with the nation-centered enterprise of constitutional redefinition in itiated by the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 20 5) . Then came ra tifi cation. Here Ackerman does not accept the partially extorted state ratifications. Instead, he details various encounters between the three branches of the federal government (conflicts over imple menting Reconstruction,s3 the impeachment of President Johnson, congressional revocation of Supreme Court jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases,s4 etc.), with Congress's repeated victories functioning as ratification.ss In this non-Article V process, "the separation of powers was taking on a key role in the ratifying process formerly monopolized by the states" (p. 209). Finally, the 1868 elections and a newly "packed" Republican Supreme Court consolida ted the amendment. The latter did so in the Sla ughterhouse Ca ses. s6 Often these cases are read as eviscerating the national citizenship that Ackerman says the Radicals meant to establish, but his focus here is process not substance: the important fact was that "Sla ughterhouse effectively ended all serious legal debate on the validity of the Four teenth Amendment" (p. 246). What the Court made of them is an other matter; Ackerman promises to elaborate judicial "synthesis" in Interpretations (p. 251).
The New Deal confronts Ackerman with his greatest challenge. The "professional narrative" of that era is based on a "myth of rediscovery" (pp. 7, 259) that the Court finally abandoned the ille gitimate review of economic regulation symbolized by Lochner v. New Yo rks1 and returned to a grand, Marshallian vision of federal power. This was, understandably, the story legal reformers told at the time. But it is historically incorrect and trivializes the revolu tionary acceptance of the welfare state. It is especially important, thinks Ackerman, to recover this transformation now, because "[w]ith the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, New Deal premises are an object of sharp legislative critique" (p. 258). Such fears date poorly; still, the People, or some portion of them, may someday decide to alter those premises. In any case, Ackerman's procedural point is that "[s]o long as America remains a dualist de mocracy, the death of a generation does not consign its constitu tional achievements to the junk heap" (p. 258). These achievements, once again, were not funneled through Article V amendments. This time, "amendment-analogues" (p. 270) came in the form of extraordinary judicial decisions: "They memorialize the rare determinations of a massive and sustained conversation by the American people. These transformative precedents have, and should have, a special status in the legal conversation. Since law yers did not make them, lawyers cannot unmake them" (p. 376).
Article V was not the means for this constitutional revolution. Instead, "[t]he New Dealers took a more nation-centered courseusing a series of national electoral victories as mandates that ulti mately induced all three branches of the national government to recognize that the People had endorsed activist national govern ment" (p. 269). First, the Depression transformed the national elec tion of 19 32 into a "signa ling election" (p. 281). Then came the New Deal proposal in the form of "corporatist legislation" that Ackerman claims would have "abolished market capitalism" and replaced it with business management, under "Presidential leader ship."58 Fortunately, the "Old Court" would not go along. Its re jection of the early New Deal, in Ackerman's narrative, played a constructive role of informing the People what was going on in Washington and forcing the New Dealers to rethink their approach to economic regulation. Hence the second New Deal: "Rather than seeking to displace the competitive market with the NIRA, Roosevelt and Congress now accepted the market as a legitimate part of the emerging economic order -so long as regulatory struc tures could be introduced to correct abuses and injustices defined through the democratic process" (p. 302). This "more refined" pro posal, entailing a "revolutionary redefinition of the citizen's rela tionship to the nation-state," was the main issue in the triggering election of 19 36 between Roosevelt and Alf Landon, an election that forced the People "to focus on fundamentals" (pp. 306, 309). FDR and the Democrats were free to alter the constitutional order -provided the Court allowed them to do so. Here is where the court-packing plan and congressional proposals for formal amend ment enter the story. There was, Ackerman claims, broad support for both (consolidation). Only when the Court "switched" and up held the second New Deal programs did popular support for coer cion abate; "the spokesmen for the People in both Congress and the White House quite re�sonably gave the Court a second chance to redeem its continued democratic legitimacy without imposing har sher measures in the form of court-packing or an Article Five amendment."59 The Court complied: consolida tion continued apace, accelerating when an unprecedented third term allowed FDR to pack the Court the old fashioned way.6 0 58. P. 286. This is a questionable interpretation of the "first" New Deal. 59. P. 343. For a different interpretation of the New Deal Supreme Court, emphasizing doctrinal evolution over revolution, see BARRY CusHMAN, RETHINKING TiiE NEW DEAL COURT (1998).
60. Ackerman refers to this change in Court membership as the second half of the two phase process of constitutional "transvaluation." P. 372. Compare CusHMAN, supra note 59.
Missing from this rethinking of the New Deal is legal realism. Ackerman equates realism with negative criticism; lacking any af firmative program, the realists offer little help to the progressive legal thinker today. In particular, he blames the realists for the "myth of rediscovery" that has obscured the New Deal's constitu tional creativity. But an unwillin gness to accept the legal realist story of the 1930s should not blind one to the role that realism played in the constitutional transformation of that time -whether characterized as a dramatic switch, a thirty-year doctrinal evolution, and/or a generational shift on the Supreme Court. Realism, in short, supplied not just an interpretation of New Deal constitution alism; it was constitutive of it. Ackerman tells the story well:
For twentieth-century critics of laissez-faire, the common law was the problem, not the solution: its vision of property, contract, and tort had created a false vision of economic freedom -ignoring the ques tions of distributive injustice, monopoly power, and other market fail ures that condemned millions to poverty and exploitation. Rather than genuflecting before this common law vision, the New Dealers sought to create a new foundation for economic freedom through democratic politics and legislative reform. [p. 370] There is no citation in this paragraph to any primary or secondary source. Perhaps one can now take silent scholarly notice of realism -but not at the same time criticize realists for failing to supply a positive vision. For the attack on common law ideology, along with an irreverent posture, came from Progressive legal thought gener ally and legal realism in particular.61 What effect it had on the People at large is more difficult to gauge. A place to start may be with Thurman Arnold: law professor, New Deal administrator, an titrust activist, and popular author.62 There are, after all, institu tions other than national elections through which to influence public opinion and by which public opinion exerts influence. Get- REv. 1973 REv. , 2008 REv. -14 (1990 . Earlier in the book Ackerman states that "New Deal doubts about Article Five reflected the larger pragmatic revolt against formalism that had swept through much of American culture during the early twentieth century," and admits that realists "expressed similar doubts, but it is a mistake to exaggerate their direct role in this affair. The academics with the greatest influence on Roosevelt -men like Frankfurter or Edward Corwin -were not Realists in any narrow sense, but they were pragmatists." Pp. 347, 486 n.3. This is again a top-down approach to the New Deal, and even on its own terms has problems: Frankfurter's "general preference for the amendment route and his opposition to '[court-]packing' were well known. ting "beyond Realism"63 -as jurisprudence and history -may enlighten. Omitting realism from an account of the New Deal does not.
Ackerman applauds the substance of the New Deal constitu tional revolution but has reservations about its modes. From the perspective of constitutional process, a presidentially led, judicially effected, non-Article V amendment-analogue offers too simple a means for unscrupulous Presidents to alter the Constitution by fill ing the Supreme Court with ideological Ju stices -what might be called actuarial court-packing. This has been attempted, Ackerman claims, most recently in the Reagan-Bush era, and it has led to "the hyperpoliticization of the Supreme Court" (p. 415). He does not, however, suggest sticking to Article V. Instead, he concludes Tra nsformations by recommending a statutory amendment process, "the Popular Sovereignty Initiative":
Proposed by a (second-term) President, this Initiative should be sub mitted to Congress for two-thirds approval, and should then be sub mitted to the voters at the next two Presidential elections. If it passes these tests, it should be accorded constitutional status by the Supreme Court. [p. 415] This procedure preserves the role of Presidential signaling (a posi tive legacy of FDR's higher lawmaking), a crucial role for Congress, and part of both Article V and the Reconstruction experiencewhile avoiding the need for ratification by three-fourths of the states. Demoted during Reconstruction, they deserve a lesser role in the amending process.
For the most part, Tra nsformations complements Fo undations. But in one important sense the two volumes differ: the author's attitude toward the People's unconventional power that is central to his story. Fo undations was published in 1991 and Ackerman was skeptical of the political atmosphere in which he wrote. He spoke of Ronald Reagan's attempts at "transformative Supreme Court ap pointments," "President Bush's proposal of a flag-burning amend ment," and warned of "false positives" and "false negatives" when testing for the five elements of legitimate change. 64 In short, Ackerman stressed how rare constitutional moments are and con cluded that there was not one in the 1980s. In the final pages, he recommended an unamendable Bill of Rights, like that in the post war German Basic Law. Tr ue, even unamendable rights might not be safe.
Nonetheless, entrenching the Bill might make the triumph of a Nazi like movement more difficult. It would serve as a reminder to all fu-63. REcoNSTRUcrING, supra note 7, at 72. 64. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 51, 320, 278-80. ture generations of a time when Americans solemnly recommitted the nation to the unconditional protection of fundamental rights .... I myself would be proud to be a member of the generation that took this burden upon itself -finally redeeming the promise of the Declaration of Independence by entrenching inalienable rights into our Constitution.65
In Tra nsformations, Ackerman remains cautious about the pop u1ar amending process, but is in the end more hopeful about and supportive of constitutional change. What happened between 1991 and today? Mr. Dooley might have had an answer. 66 Whatever the cause, Ackerman now is not just an archeologist of popu1ar sover eignty; he is also a (qualified) champion of it. He remains a dualist, but thesis and antithesis are closer together now than then, which may just be the logic of such things.
B. Amar's (Nouvelle) Fe deralism
Where Ackerman rides the high track of constitutional politics, Amar follows its twists and turns, surveying where the Founders tried to lead the nation and where the Supreme Court has redi rected it. In part I, a revision of an earlier article entitled Th e Bill of Rights as a Co nstitution,67 his goal is nothing less than to tum the conventional wisdom ab out the Bill of Rights on its head. He shou1d succeed. Amar argues that the original ten amendments were not intended solely, or even primarily, to defend individual rights. Instead, they were designed to elaborate and qualify the structural principles of the Constitution. Most imp ortant was feder alism: the Bill was supposed to maintain the power of the states relative to the federal govemment.68
To frame his case, Amar quotes James Madison in Fe dera list 51 -"[i]t is of great imp ortance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of 65. Id. at 320-21. 66. Cf. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DooLEY AT His BEST 77 (Elmer Ellis ed., 1938) (observing after the In sular Cases that "th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction returns"). [Vol. 97:1520 the society against the injustice of the other part"69 -and argues that [t] he conventional understanding of the Bill seems to focus almost exclusively on the second issue (protection of minority against major ity) while ignoring the first (protection of the people against self interested government). Yet as I shall show, this first issue was in deed first in the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights. [p. xiii)
As Amar enjoins, "first things first" (p. 3). Does it matter that Madison in Fe deralist 51 was not thinking about the Bill of Rights (which did not yet exist)? Perhaps not, if he was discussing the rights of majorities and minorities at a sufficiently abstract level. Primarily, though, in this essay Madison sought to show that the federal government, much more than the state governments, obeyed the salutary principle of separated powers, which would prevent one institution within it from predominating -in particu lar, the legislature. The "vices of the political system of the United States," as Madison entitled his survey of the states and Confederation,70 made him fearful of legislatures. His goal in 51 was to explain how legislative will would be diluted and checked, not to celebrate majoritarian democr:acy.
Ju st after the sentence in Fe deralist 51 that Amar quotes, Madison explained how the structure of the federal government (again, not the Bill of Rights) would check the majority: "Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a major ity be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure." He saw two ways to protect minorities. The first was to create a hereditary ruler, embodying "a will in the community independent of the majority." The second was to "comprehend[ ] in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very im probable .... "71 The latter was the way of the federal Constitution. He was elaborating his argument in Fe deralist 10 that a large repub lic mitigated the problem of factional majorities throughout the whole and applying the same logic to institutional competition within the federal government. Hence the bicameral, not unicam eral, legislature. In addition, "[a]s the weight of the legislative au thority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature, appears, at first view, to be the natural defence with which the executive magistrate should be armed." Madison had failed to get such a veto included at Philadelphia; in Fe deralist 51 he proposed (as an amendment?) a veto council composed of the President and Senators.n So much for using Fe deralist 51 to frame a majoritarian interpretation of any part of the Constitution.
. However decontextualized his quotation, Amar is on to some thing. He might have used Madison's Fe deralist 10 and 51 to make an even stronger case that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect the states (or localities) more than minorities had he contrasted them with any number of anti-Federalist criticisms of the new Con stitution as a threat to local control over government.73 In this jux taposition, the Bill was, as conventional wisdom has it, designed to remedy the weaknesses of the Constitution. But rather than pro tect minority interests, it was supposed to protect more familiar in stitutions -state and local -from the new, distant, and purposely elitist federal government. To push this interpretation farther, there may be more protection of minorities (economic and re gional) in the main body of the Constitution than in the Bill of Rights. But this would require revisionism on a scale quite beyond even that of Amar's.
Similarly, Amar is right to emphasize the importance of the jury in eighteenth-century America. Fo r him, the jury connotes local ism, fear of distant decisionmakers, populism, and majority rule. He is right ab out the first two. In a constitutional history of the British Empire, the American Revolution, and early United States, it would be hard to exaggerate the jury; it was a metaphor for local ism, due process, and open lawmaking and enforcement. Eben Moglen reminds us that there was a "cluster" of rights associated with the jury, many not individual but rather communal rights.74 Amar drives this theme home effectively. To o effectively. Localism is not -at least, was not in the eighteenth century -the same as populism or maj oritarianism. The latter words were foreign to both Fe deralists and anti-Federalists, few of whom were democrats.75 Nor was it identical to the province or state, notwithstanding 72. Id 
75.
Amar enj oins lawyers to study "the lessons of the 'republican revival,'" which he equates with majoritarian government. P. 302. But see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 282 (1967) (noting that '"democ racy' ... was generally associated with the threat of civil disorder and the early assumption of power by a dictator").
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Amar's repeated equation of "local" with "state."76 Instead, it con noted a jurisdiction smaller :;ind more manageable. The social poli tics in these places were quite complex, varying widely across space and through time, but few historians would characterize them as populist; rather, they would talk of deference society, some of oli garchy, others of violent subcultures defying simple characteriza tion.77 Whatever the nature of the Revolution, the constitutional debate certainly was about who should rule at home -and the boundaries of that home.
So the jury deserves a closer look. As those most familiar with law enforcement in early America have noted, the ideal of the jury trial had its limits. When it came to everyday crime, the jury was seen by provincial legislative houses as obstructionist -as it was by imperial eyes in gubernatorial forts, Council chambers, and in Whitehall. Thus colonial legislatures became innovators in the business of summ ary jurisdiction: quick, efficient criminal process, without juries.78 To risk too fine a point, what was good enough for urban rowdies, slaves, and frontier squatters was not good enough for transatlantic merchants and substantial land speculators.
Of course, these "lawless" elements could invoke the jury, too. For them, the jury functioned as a safety valve against both imperial and provincial jurisdiction, vindicating interests as local as those of a family.79 Some of them helped ensure that the jury was guaran teed in several state constitutions (a point worth revisiting), though colonial summary justice endured written constitution-making in tact.80 Intraprovincial jurisdictional politics (for lack of a better phrase), like imperial-provincial jurisdictional politics, was a real phenomenon, though undertheorized and also unnamed. After the Revolution, the latter received a name (federalism); the former did not. By framing the controversy as the federal government (and the People) versus the states, the Federalists (in part accidentally) eliminated local government from the articulate debates over the eralism remains one of the under examined mysteries of the American Revolution and the early United States.81 In the consti tutional debate, local government was the dog that did not bark.
Or did it? Amar inadvertently permits us to listen again. When anti-Federalists championed the jury, the militia, church establish ments, and so forth, many meant to protect the states, certainly, but some also hoped to vindicate those familiar local worlds. This is what makes Amar's work so intriguing. He comes close to redis covering those worlds in Chapter Three, on "The Military Amend ments." There he argues that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" for purposes of "a well regulated Militia'' was a "states'right," not an individual right (p. 52). Given the choice, he is more correct than not. But he acknowledges that "this chain of argument has some weak links" (p. 52). The same language appears in sev eral state constitutions, suggesting that the militias and arms bearing were not fully controlled by the states. While state govern ments could (as the federal government could) organize and disci pline militias in emergencies, they too lacked the power to disarm their members (p. 52). It is to Amar's credit that he concedes problems with a "states' -rights" reading of the Second Amendment. But he declines his own invitation to explore how the militia actu ally functioned. It has its historians, and they tell us that it was a local institution -which is to say, more often than not, organized by elites at the most local level, county or town.82 The state-versus individual model fails to capture these provincial sociopolitics.
Which brings us back to anti-Federalist worship of the jury. Ti me and again anti-Federalists criticized the Constitution for not specifying that criminal jury trials would be held in the vicinage of the alleged crime and failing to guarantee the jury trial in federal [Vol. 97:1520 civil trials at all . Hamilton responded to the latter complaint in Fe deralist 83 by surveying the state legal systems. He pointed out that "there is a material diversity as well in the modification as in the extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases in the sev eral states."83 In light of this diversity, the Constitutional Convention could not have created a general rule consistent with all the state systems. Hamilton treated state proposals for a jury amendment as unworkable and unwise. Such an amendment was unworkable because it might require the federal courts to alter their use of juries as they circulated among the states: "The capricious operation of so dissimilar a method of trial in the same cases, under the same government, is of itself sufficient to indispose every well regulated judgment towards it."84 It was also unwise, for "there are many cases in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one":85 for example, diplomatic cases, those involving the law of nations, prize, and equity. Perhaps the Convention might have used "one state as a model for the whole," but in the end it was thought best to leave the "arduous" task of devising a uniform plan to "the discretion of the legislature."86
Anti-Federalists got their jury amendments: the Sixth guaran teed a local jury in criminal cases, the Seventh declared that "In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury should be pre served. "87 It would seem that this compromissary language ignored the diffi culty Hamilton and others pointed out, that there was among the states no standard against which to determine when and how to use the jury in federal civil trials. Amar concludes that the Seventh Amendment was designed to incorporate that diversity: the federal courts were to employ the jury, or not, as state law where they sat dictated, notwithstanding administrative inefficien cies. In short, the Founders intended federal courts to follow a "dy namic" approach to procedure (pp. 89-93) like that now used for substantive law under Erie. There is evidence that a few anti
Federalists did indeed assume that jury trials in the federal courts would fluctuate with location.88 But most did not give too much thought to how the guarantee would operate in practice. As George Mason, a Virginia anti-Federalist, said in Philadelphia, the diversity of state practice meant that "jury cases can not be speci fied. A general principle laid down on this and some other points would be sufficient."89 The key, as always, was the principle of the jury; here, as with those "other" principles, practical operation was ignored. It is difficult to conclude, with Amar, that a "dynamic" approach to the civil jury is most faithful. 93. There are many moments of positivist perception of the co=on law scattered throughout Anglo-American history. Rarely mere intellectual epiphanies, they arise instead amidst concrete political controversies -or, more accurately, operate as arguments within those controversies. Cf. Ackerman, Tr ansformations, at 370-72; Amar, supra note 9, at 694-95; Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Vo lume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Th eory, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1785 REv. , 1786 REv. (1997 [Vo l. 97:1520 that the Reconstruction amendments demoted federalism, the states, and implicitly all local units in the constitutional order. Here is where the individualist connotation of the Bill of Rights emerged. In short, the Founder's structural Bill became our minorities protective Bill; states' rights became individual rights. No longer partners in an ambiguous division of governmental duties, the states were subordinated in the constitutional hierarchy, and the federal government defined the rights of federal citizenship.94
The shift was not as stark as all that. Amar nicely describes how the more individualistic interpretation enjoyed an underground life during the antebellum period.95 Always latent, it came out of reces sion and into dominance with the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
Having traced the structure-to-rights transformation, Amar turns to the issue of whether the framers of Reconstruction in tended to incorporate the first ten amendments against the states. In a subtle theory of "refined incorporation," Amar argues that some should be incorporated and some should not. In any case, the vehicle should be the Privileges and Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause, for Amar argues that the crux of Reconstruction was the redefinition of national citizenship. In de termining whether this or that right is a privilege of national citizen ship, he embraces neither the "traditions of · English liberty" approach associated with Justice Felix Frankfurter nor the total in corporation approach of Justice Hugo Black. He instead asks whether a particular protection "is a personal privilege -that is, a private right -of individual citizens, rather than a right of states or the public at large" (p. 22 1). If the latter, then it seems to him con tradictory to apply the states'-right against the states. But if it is an individual right, or a structural right that was transformed into an individual right, then it should be incorporated against the states.
The most interesting example of the last sort is the First Amendment's prohibition against religious establishments. Many states had established churches in 1789; the fear behind the Estab lishment Clause was that the federal government might erect a na tional church similar to the Church of England. Amar nicely calls it "a home rule -local option provision" (p. 246 ) . Thus it is, from an originalist perspective, illogical to incorporate the clause, as it was supposed to protect some state establishments.96 But Amar argues 94. For a similar earlier interpretation, see Kaczorowski, supra note 51, at 398 (arguing that the Fo urteenth Amendment "wrought nothing less than a revolution in American feder· alism" and enlarged the civil rights guaranteed by national citizenship).
95. See also Willi am E. Nelson, Th e Impact of the Anti-Slavery Movement Up on Styles of Ju dicial Reasoning in Nin eteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1974) .
96. See Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Un constitll· tional, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2347 REv. (1997 .
that the disestablishment of state churches by Reconstruction and the prohibition of establishments in the Western territories together transformed constitutional attitudes toward religion: there was fear of any state favoritism toward particular denominations. This was not because of declining religiosity; perhaps just the opposite. The splintering of old denominations and creation of new ones in creased mutual suspicions. In a perfect world, some denominations would have liked state support. In early national America, how ever, better that the state remain neutral.97
Incorporating "the freedom of speech, or of the press," is easier. It was from the beginnin g a mixed right, of states (relating to parlia mentary privileges) and individuals (for example, the right to peti tion) .98 The rights interpretation spread in reaction to Southern suppression of abolitionist literature and reached the Congressional Record in the 1860s (pp. 235-39). But again Amar's analysis is too neat. While exploring the intersection of the Fi rst and Fo urteenth Amendments, he looks ahead one hundred years to justify modern free speech doctrine. In particular, he must confront "the doctrinal rules crafted by Sullivan and its progeny [that] reflect obvious suspi cion of juries -resulting, for example, in various issues being clas sified as legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact inappropriate for unconstrained jury determination." (p. 243). Where has the jury gone?
Once the Fourteenth Amendment is on the books, the agency theory of free speech is less explanatory than the minority-protection theory, for the latter better accounts for speech limitations on majoritarian state legislatures. And the minority-protection theory suggests a dif ferent optimal allocation between judge and jury. [p. 244] This is quite a jump and leaves out much history of the relationship between judge and jury in American law.99 And why is Amar cer tain that judges are more competent guardians of rights than juries? He never explains; he might assume that it has something to do with the different origins, socialization, and peer group of those who rise to the bench compared to those in the jury box. But this sort of history resides in sources largely outside those he explores -largely, but not completely, for such reasoning is similar to Finally, Amar claims that the individualistic interpretation of the Bill is a product of Reconstruction. But most of the cases cited to prove this date much later, the most important after 1890, mak ing for a long Reconstruction moment.100 More importantly, Amar's three-level institutional framework -nation, state, and in dividual -makes it difficult to see other ways to interpret the con stitutional shift of the late nineteenth century. As with the lack of focus on local government at the Founding, the automatic move from state to individual misses other actors: groups located be tween the state and the individual. Amar writes that "between 1775 and 1866 the poster boy of arms morphed from the Concord min uteman to the Carolina freedman" (p. 266; emphasis added). But was that Carolina freedman a single, rights-bearing individual? Or did his right (assuming Amar is correct that he had one1°1) depend on a different but still collective identity, namely, as a newly liber ated African American in the deep South? The problem here par allels that of equating the local with the state at the Founding. In short, is the story of the Bill of Rights from Reconstruction to the present really about individual rights?102 Would not an account that emphasized solicitude for groups help explain both the Slaughterhouse Cases103 as well as those overruling them, including Santa Clara County, standing for the proposition that corporations were constitutional people too?104 Instead, Amar's iconoclastic narrative turns back toward the conventional wisdom. Only the dates were wrong. Having corrected those, his story becomes famil iar: "the Reconstruction generation -not their Founding fathers or grandfathers -took a crumbling and somewhat obscure edifice, placed it on new, high ground, and remade it so that it truly would stand as a temple of liberty and justice for all" (p. 288).
One can disagree with Amar's analysis of whether a particular right represents a state prerogative, a privilege or immunity of na tional citizenship, or a group right, but the theory of refined incor poration has much to offer. Also intriguing is his suggestion that the Bill be approached "holistically," rather than as "discrete blocks of text, with each segment examined in isolation" (pp. xi-xii ). His torically this makes much sense; jurisprudentially, it may be based upon unreal expectations about how adjudication operates. In the end, Amar is not terribly concerned about the latter because he believes that "[s]elective incorporation is largely right in result and instinct," so that "today's judges and lawyers have often gotten it right without quite realizing why."105 He does not elaborate what he means here by "right" but implies that judges should interpret the amendments according to the historical meaning ascribed to their text when written, or in light of new meanings generated by subsequent constitutional experience similarly memorialized in text. He, like Ackerman, is engaged in a form of evolutionary originalism. Tue means and telos of this process is popular sovereignty.
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Despite the many di fferences between these books, popular sov ereignty is the dominant theme in both. In their collective constitu tional history, federalism becomes less important after the Civil War, and the separation of powers has always been a secondary theme. Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, was fundamental to the Constitution's creation, played a key role in its reconstruc tion( s ), and remains today the most important premise of American constitutionalism. Accordingly, "the People," as a heuristic device, does a lot of work in these histories, giving rise to moments of rhe torical populism.10 6 But this devotion to the People invites special scrutiny, not least because these books will most likely not be read by the people on the street.101 105. P. 307. Amar notes that an exception is constitutional criminal procedure, the sub ject of another book. See p. 307 n.*; AKHn. REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMI NAL PROCEDURE: Fmsr PRINCIPLES (1997).
106. See Ackerman p. x (stating in his acknowledgments that "I hope this book partially repays my enormous debt to the institutions, and the country, that made it possible"); Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1043, n.t (1988) (dedicating article to his father who asked him to write something "for the people").
107. But see Amar p. 296 (stating that "this is a book written not just for lawyers and judges but for ordinary citizens who care about our Constitution").
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The persistence of the principle of popular sovereignty over two centuries does not mean that it conveys the same thing today as in 1781.10s Ackerman and Amar realize this, and they try to show how the procedural mechanisms of popular sovereignty have changed over time. They assume that, substantively, popular sover eignty has always meant maj oritarianism. Both are combatting the problem of the "countermajoritarian difficulty"109 (i.e, judicial re view) in constitutional studies in two ways. Fi rst, they shift focus away from the Supreme Court to other institutions. Second, they emphasize how profoundly maj oritarian American constitutional ism is, so that one can see, with Alexander Hamilton, that judicial review is actually one more instrument of the people's will . 11° Popular sovereignty, however, does not necessarily imply majoritarian democracy -whether monist or dualist; invocations of popular sovereignty have often been ambiguous, part devotion to the people, part interested rhetorical strategy.111 At the very least, the Fo unders, Federalist and anti-Federalist alike, were not simple maj oritarians. 112 The democratic connotation of popular sover eignty did not become widespread for decades after the Revolution and involved a massive constitutional transformation almost unno ticed in these books, perhaps because it took place at the state level. That history is associated with the Jacksonian era, but even then it resulted in a limited version of democracy, working toward univer sal white male suffrage, the abolition of property qualifications for elective office, and an increased number of elected officials.113 The trend resumed in the Progressive Era, which saw the extension of the vote to women (especially native-born white women), initiatives and referenda, and directly elected Senators.
To date, the constitutional history of Progressivism remains un written. When it is, Ackerman's compression of his third constitu tional moment to the 1930s may seem less persuasive -as Amar suggests in his afterword.114 Instead, constitutional development will be seen to have played out on a larger stage of social and intel lectual change, turning on the construction and legitimation of the administrative state. It is an interesting question, for example, how one might reconcile Ackerman's New Deal with that of legal histo rian Edward Purcell Jr.115 let alone that of social historian Lizabeth Cohen, to name just some who have helped excavate the 1930s.
The people in Cohen's book, Making a New Deal, for example, do not look much like the People in Ackerman's. Cohen's people had racial, ethnic, class, regional, and other identities. They were not passive consumers of political debates, responding yea or nea to the calls from the federal capital. Instead, they absorbed media in a much more complicated manner, reinterpreting political news and a host of mass-distributed signs in unexpected ways.116 Maybe there was a "deeper" story being scripted in Washington, D.C., in 1936; but how was that text read? Did voters believe they were engaged in a referendum on a constitutional "amendment-analogue"? Quite plausibly many did. It is equally plausible that most voted along (literally) familiar party lines. Possibly many accepted FDR be cause he lived up to his promise to do something -though that something remained unrealized, unclear, and controversial -and that when others rej ected Alf Landon they were rej ecting Alf Lan don, not embracing a new constitutional paradigm. These explana tions are all probably true to some extent. To find out which are more true than others would require more research, in a wider vari ety of sources, than has hitherto been attempted. Court opinions, presidential speeches, and election returns will not carry the burden of proof.117 Perhaps it is a proposition that will not admit of histori cal proof -or disproof. That FDR was popular, and the Supreme Court's doctrine was not, and that the latter changed -somehow, at some point -and came into accord with the program of the 114. See Amar p. 300 (surveying the Progressive amendments and asking whether it is "necessary to postulate an unwritten amendment in the 1930s to account for a more national ist and redistributive constitutional regime in the twentieth century"). 255-81 (1986) . Ackerman applauds a study of public support for FDR's court-packing plan before and after the Supreme Court's "switch" in 1937, which indicates that a majority of the polled public approved the plan as a means to defeat judicial obstructionism. P. 324. But support for court-packing is not the same thing as support for a de facto constitutional amendment.
See EDWARD
[Vo l. 97:1520 former, is enough for Ackerman. Constitutional change happened; therefore the People willed it to happen. He is interested in the political process -the constitutional process -of unconventional amendment, not the cultural conflict behind it, so he can be for given for leaving out from what is already a substantial undertaking the sort of close historical analysis necessary to explain a shift in constitutional meaning. The problem is that his method of research and argumentation bear an uncertain relation to his ultimate claim that the People, en masse, participated in the process.
To bolster his cultural history of the Constitution, Ackerman uses a literary technique increasingly found in legal scholarship: the fictitious voice.118 In Ackerman's case, it speaks in a monologue: "the Prophetic Vo ice" of We the People. This device is new to Vol ume 2 and is meant to be critical. But unlike most law review dra matis personae, Ackerman's lacks irony. The People speak truth, clearly. Listen as the Prophetic Vo ice opens chapter one:
My fellow Americans, we are in a bad way. We are drifting. Our leaders are compromising, compromised. They have lost sight of gov ernment's basic purposes.
It is time for us to take the future into our own hands. Each of us has gained so much from life in America. Can we remain idle while this great nation drifts downward?
No: We must join together in a movement for national renewal, even if this means self-sacrifice. We will not stop until the govern ment has heard our voice.
The People must retake control of government. We must act deci sively to bring the law in line with the promise of American life. [p. 3] others. The melody is eclectic, though Progressive tones dominate. It sounds more prosperous than not, with the peremptory cadence of talk radio. The Voice speaks rarely in Ackerman's pages, but it remains the protagonist. "It is this voice that will concern us here, as well as the distinctive attitude Americans have cultivated in its exercise" (p. 3). Listen, and government will be returned to the People's control.
Why the Prophetic Voice? Perhaps its most arresting quality is that it sounds so different from another abstraction influencing legal studies, an abstraction that Ackerman has explored elsewhere: the Market.125 The Voice shows faith in human agency, affirmative social justice, and redistribution -at least of political power. When the government is out of control, the People should reassert power, not repose faith in the invisible hand.
But is government out of the People's control? Certainly the federal government sometimes appears to be so, especially when observed on Washington-originated news programs: repetition, punditry, stone-skipping history, and much talk of the People. Change the channel, however, and a more meaningful, if more tedi ous, government comes into focus. On local access channels, little is heard of the People; instead, actual people discuss concrete needs, desires, and fears. There one hears about tax rates, public improvements, and education. Then there are the myriad contro versies about the physical environment in which people live and work each day, all the tough, sometimes nasty social and cultural politics that fall under the rubric of zoning. To find out what popu lar sovereignty means today, it may be time to take a new look at local government.
Along with zooming in on the local world, one might pan out beyond the nation. Of course, deciphering the past is difficult enough. Still, query whether the jurisdictions studied in these books -the United States, as a nation and constituent stateswill remain the primary units of jurisdictional analysis in law schools of the future. With the resurgence of zip-code identity on the one hand, and world wide web access on the other, where pre cisely will nationality fit in? Reports of the nation-state's death have been exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is unclear how Ackerman's and Amar's students will receive the professors' nationalist narra tive. To the historian of twenty-first century consciousness, any dis junction might indicate changing recruitment and socialization within that profession or between its scholars and practitioners.
Of course, the nation will not pass. But it will continue to change shape, and its claims on the identity of its citizens will [Vol. 97:1520 change too. Similarly, any decline of national identity would not mean the decline of the United States. Is there a framework for understanding how people might draw on several political identities simultaneously, emphasizing one for certain purposes and a second or third for others? Consider that the United States emerged from an early modern empire, became gradually in the nineteenth cen tury a nation, and may now be metamorphosing again into another kind of empire, one marked by the diffuse but palpable spread of its culture, including its legal culture. It is a special kind of imperial ism, full of informal modes of operation, more like those of the early modern period than the nineteenth-century. Here is where the pre-history of American constitutionalism might be instructive. Ackerman writes that the prophetic Vo ice of the People has spoken "[s]ince the first Englishmen colonized America" (p. 3) but is unin terested in what it was saying for almost two centuries before 1787.
In the early modern world, English influence spread less through official foreign policy than the "ventures" of privileged groups, often joint-stock companies possessing, to one degree or another, license from the crown. At various times the King, his Privy Coun cil, or his agents in America tried to centralize imperial policy, fail ing more often than not, so that it is only a bit of an exaggeration to see the American Revolution as less a progressive fight for democ racy than a reactionary defense of long (and not so long) accrued local privileges against an increasingly interventionist central gov ernment.126 Earlier it was argued that early modern localism was greatly concerned with jurisdictions smaller than the state. These were not just towns and counties. A corporation, for example, could be a territorial jurisdiction, or it might be something else. As the etymological fiction had it, corporations were alive. And they moved. Or if the head -the governing board -was immobile,127 at least the arms might reach out to new lands, across political boundaries, redrawing them in the process. This had been true of corporations in the Anglophone world at least since the earliest set tlement of the American continent, much of which was conducted by groups organized as corporations. 128 In short, such scripts did not always protect "a local communitarian spirit."129 Claims of im munity from central government could, paradoxically, serve impe rial ambitions.
To day's functional equivalents might be multinational corpora tions. The multinational is just that: operative in many jurisdic tions, ambivalently related to each. But usually it speaks American-English, and so too its default legal vocabulary derives from the United States. The global marketplace, after all, looks and sounds familiar. Negotiating among these corporations are the new diplomats, investment bankers and consultants; a top-notch American professional degree (more often M.B.A. than J.D.)130 re placing striped pants as the anthropological marker. More perti nent to the books at hand is the influence of U.S. constitutionalism abroad. The fe deral Constitution has long been an international model, at least a source of concepts and vocabulary carried abroad by legal missionaries. The Fo unders claimed (as both Ackerman and Amar approvingly note) that they were contributing to "the Science of Politics";131 it was to be a constitution on a hill , a beacon to those less fortunate. Witness the constitutional scholars who flocked to Eastern Europe ten years ago, as well as the traditional conflation of U.S. constitutional norms and universal values. 132 The old historical debate here about the sources of U.S. legal culture (Anglicization? Americanization?) may soon replicate itself, with cosmopolitan mutations, at an international level (Americaniza tion? globalization?). Thus American ideas may well dominate global constitutionalism, and so discussion of the standards of legiti mate constitutional change may persist. But five-step formulae and American paradigm cases will probably not "translate"133 out of the present historical situation.134
When highlighting the popular sovereignty premise of Ameri can constitutionalism, both are indebted to the "republican revival" in early American history. But times are changing in the history departments and republicanism, liberalism, and the ideological in terpretation are not what they used to be. Gordon Wo od's Creation [Vol. 97:1520 of the American Republic135 will for a long time remain the best study of the constitution-making period. But it must be supple mented by newer work in social and institutional history, and stud ies just emerging from the renaissance of Atlantic history. 136 Of course, republicanism is not going away; it was not just a product of the Cold War. It will , however, be assimilated into an ever ex panding historiographical repertoire, as historians turn to other old and new frameworks to understand the movement of people and ideas throughout the world. Whiggish histories of how Americans perfected the science of politics are already turning stale, as histori ans become more skeptical of national exceptionalism and tri umphalism (the juggernaut of popular sovereignty included). Consequently, the historical premise of both Ackerman and Amar seems a bit dated. But often fashions change too fast in the acad emy, and some interpretations deserve the long half-life they enj oy in the survey literature. The question is why embellish this one now? Or, what is the point of reconstructing American constitu tional history as the progressive vindication of popular sovereignty?
III. THE NEW LEGAL HISTORICISM137
Criticisms of Ackerman's and Amar's historical interpretations are open to the charge of irrelevance because they (especially Ackerman)138 deny that they are writing professional history. In stead, they are trying to rewrite (again, in Ackerman's terms) the "professional narrative" of constitutional change. Theirs are explic itly forward-looking, usable pasts, not so much "lawyers' history," "forensic history," or "lawyers' legal history"139 as history fo r law yers. Which is to say that their historical constitutionalism is in tended less to add weapons to the advocate's arsenal than to change the way the legal community conceptualizes the Constitution and change beneath it.
At some level, this concern with legitimating constitutional change is a measure of the success of conservative originalism.14 0 Proposed amendments to undo postwar liberal jurisprudence and candid, actuarial court-packing suggested to Ackerman a stultifying "hypertextualism" on the one hand and a "legal realist" approach to constitutionalism on the other -the tasteless extremes, he thinks, of the constitutional menu offered in today's law schools. He criticizes both and works to define a middle road for constitu tional theory.141 In a different way, Amar's "one-two synthesis" of the Founding and Reconstruction (p. 300), showing how and when the rights-oriented Bill became "America's Parthenon" (p. xi), is implicitly designed to refute the deliberately ahistorical, plain meaning version of textualism that might undermine those rights, as well as cast doubt on historically untethered, extratextual rights.
A frustrating aspect of Amar's book is that he never discusses his minor premise: that historically informed textualism is the cor rect way to interpret the Constitution today. He assumes that if his history and interpretations are correct they should be the standard against which to measure constitutional law. Even if he is right about that history and those interpretations, this is a large assump tion and needs more support. He never explicitly discusses the plain meaning textual approach. He never explains, as Ackerman does, why his method is preferable to democratic "monism" or neo Kantian rights jurisprudence. About unenumerated rights, he writes that "we need a good account of these rights before we can use open-ended language to interpolate between and extrapolate beyond these textual rights."142 One might agree with this ap proach, but is its legitimacy self-evident?
Ackerman is more explicit about his methods. Many have talked about the importance of legal consciousness, but few agree on what it is and how it might be changed.143 Ackerman actually wants to alter the profession's consciousness; given the number of pages he publishes and reviews he receives, he may. Not all of his discursive innovations will survive the Darwinist process of law school mainstreaming, but many willsome already have. After 140. See KALMAN, supra note 61, at 132-43 (discussing the "tum to history" in the legal academy).
141. This is not the first time Ackerman has embraced and transformed the methodolo gical innovations of those whose politics conflict with his own. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 42-45 (challenging law professors to accept techniques of law and economics while rejecting its conclusions). 142. P. 299. While Amar claims that he is not opposed to judicial protection of unenumerated rights, his tone, at least, suggests serious reservations about them. See, e.g., p. 297 (referring to the "'these are a few of my favorite rights"' style of constitutional theory).
143. See REcoNSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 70-71.
Ronald Dworkin, he is arguably the preeminent liberal jurisprudent of his generation.
He means to make the most of his lectern. Long ago Ackerman flagged socialization as integral to the "reconstruction" of Ameri can law. It was imperative, he wrote, "to consider how the law shapes social perception and evaluation through a complex process of education and indoctrination."144 At the same time, "no group of professionals can survive economically, sociologically, spiritually without a general sense that it provides a distinctive service of value."145 In other words, law -its institutions and discoursesinfluences valuation; but in tum, the legal community demands that its resources be normatively grounded. A basic narrative of consti tutional history might change that conceptual basis and supply those values. Historical integrity is not the point. Professional in tegrity is. So Ackerman has constructed the most ambitious outline of American legal history since that of Roscoe Pound.146 Like Pound, Ackerman is trying to awaken the profession to its formative eras. He too is drawn to social science methods, and he has an uncom fortable but intellectually genetic relation to legal realism (Pound a pedantic, long-lived ancestor,147 Ackerman a scolding heir). Miss ing, of course, is Pound's academic Germanophilia. Indeed, a strik ing aspect of Ackerman's work is its fealty to English-American ways. "I have been trying," he writes early in Transformations, "to redeem the promise of Anglo-American legal method" (p. 66). Similarly, in Fo undations he complained that his colleagues' "ex alted talk of Kant and Locke only emphasizes the elitism involved in removing fundamental questions from the democratic process"14 8 and then celebrated the empirical, "Burkean" common lawyer: \Vhat counts for the common lawyer is not some fancy theory but the patterns of concrete decision built up by courts and other practical decisionmakers over decades, generations, centuries .... The task of the Burkean lawyer or judge is to master these precedents, thereby gaining a sense of their hidden potentials for growth and decay.149
What Ackerman means by the common law is not always clear (not, of course, an idiosyncratic problem).150 At times common law method means simply respect for precedent. At others it sounds like evolutionary custom. It can also mean the induction of principle from the raw material of legal behavior on the ground. Once found, it remains the same, even as its derivative rules and applications mutate,151 not unlike the fivefold formula of constitu tional amendment. Fi nally, Ackerman's common law recalls Pound's distinction between law in action and law in books. "For common lawyers," Ackerman writes, "the key is not what a court says, but what it does."152 So too it is with the Constitution, prac tice fleshing out text.
Of these, abstraction most characterizes his history. Ta ke for example his metaphor in Fo undations illustrating the contention that "the path of the law is from the particularistic to comprehen sive analysis":
Think of the American Republic as a railroad train, with the judges of the middle republic sitting in the caboose, looking backward. What they see are the mountains and valleys of dualistic constitutional ex perience, most notably the peaks of constitutional meaning elabo rated during the Founding and Reconstruction. As the train moves forward in history, it is harder for the judges to see the traces of vol canic ash that marked each mountain's political emergence onto the legal landscape. At the same time, a different perspective becomes more available: as the second mountain moves into the background, it becomes easier to see that there is now a mountain range out there that can be described in a comprehensive way.153 This is remarkable: the judiciary as a backward-looking institution, struggling to make sense of the whole constitutional experience, constantly moving out from the specific intent of a transformative amendment toward its more general, fundamental meaning. As with so much of Ackerman's elegant analysis, it is hard to refute, standing as it does on its own premises and following the logic of induction almost instinctive to lawyers. The result is a wonderful picture. Start with the way it naturalizes constitutional develop ment, leaving the judiciary as an artificial element in the land scape,154 with no agency but passive, myopic observation. Fo rget the concrete, contingent, human disputes that fuel litigation. When that surface grime is cleaned away, the masterpiece is revealed. The Supreme Court's role is less to say what the Constitution is than gradually behold the wonders of constitutional creation, as [Vol. 97:1520 Justices glimpse beyond the picturesque (or not so picturesque) to the beautiful, perhaps farther. Theirs is an art of mimesis. But it is just a metaphor. Ultimately, Ackerman remains a constitutional positivist; the law may be sublime but not otherworldly. Deus ex machina is the People. And the Court does play an active role of "intergenerational synthesis," an idea rehearsed quickly in the first two volumes and the promised subject of the third, In terpretations. The highlight there will be his treatment of Brown v. Board of Education. 155 Ackerman is genuinely concerned with how unrooted the legal presumptions of his generation seem, how susceptible they have been to conservative attack: originalism and textualism in the case of constitutional jurisprudence, invocations of the market in private law. He has asked whether his is "a generation of betrayal"156 be cause it has not persuasively justified the New Deal or the Supreme Court's postwar civil rights cases. Which might be to say that it has yet to answer the question of whether Brown adheres to a neutral principle.157 Ackerman's civics lesson is designed to tutor lawyers in more creative ways of apprehending both the New Deal and postwar liberal jurisprudence. He hopes to replace the Lochner im age of judicial review,15 8 which led to the countermajoritarian inter pretation, with a popular sovereignty one. The goal is to demonstrate that a synthesis of Reconstruction's popularly accepted principle of racial equality with the New Deal's popularly accepted principle of the national welfare state justifies Brown.159 This is a laudable jurisprudential objective, notwithstanding its his torical simplifications. But communal narratives have their ambig uous side (not least because resistant to conscious rewriting); orthodox theories tend to scant heterodox practices.160 And query whether his legitimacy-inducing narrative, especially as it achieves some autonomy from its author, may support something other than 160. Although Ackerman and Amar are committed to demonstrating that the Constitu tion has changed over time, they hesitate to acknowledge that multiple interpretations might exist at any one time.
